One of Malawi’s most respected diplomats and authors, Kena Mphonda, recently in a LinkedIn post timely reflected on the state of career diplomacy in #Malawi. Drawing lessons from the U.S. Foreign Service Act of 1924, a law that professionalised and structured America’s diplomatic corps. He further noted that Malawi has no equivalent legislation to anchor its own foreign service. For him, this gap is not merely a bureaucratic omission but a missed opportunity to build a professional, accountable, and resilient diplomatic institution. As a former diplomat and his student, I believe his proposition deserves serious and urgent attention.
Within the region, I have noted, Kenya offers a compelling example of what such legislation can achieve. Its 2011 Foreign Service Act introduced merit-based recruitment, structured training, and predictable career progression, transforming its diplomatic corps from a politically driven system into a professional institution. Today, Kenya’s ambassadors and envoys are widely regarded as credible and skilled representatives of their country’s interests. The reform strengthened not only Kenya’s diplomacy but also its national credibility—a reputation firmly built on the foundation of its Foreign Service Act.
Malawi faces a similar moment of reckoning. Our foreign policy has long relied on presidential directives and ministerial pronouncements, yet the institutional backbone of our diplomatic service remains fragile. As we emerge from the 17 September elections, the absence of a dedicated legal framework leaves the foreign service vulnerable to political shifts, undermining continuity and predictability. This fragility is not theoretical; it has been painfully evident in our diplomatic history and the administrations that have come and gone.
Consider the pending recall of Violet Chakwera from the London mission following the electoral defeat of the Malawi Congress Party and her father, former President Lazarus Chakwera. Her appointment by then, was widely criticised as nepotistic, reflected political privilege rather than professional merit. The controversy eroded Malawi’s credibility abroad and raised legitimate questions about whether our diplomatic service truly operates in the national interest. A Foreign Services Act, with its insistence on transparent vetting and merit-based appointments, would have prevented such episodes and protected the integrity of our diplomacy.
On several occasions, the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament has directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to recall diplomats whose postings were never properly approved. These episodes revealed serious gaps in oversight and coordination, with individuals representing Malawi abroad without lawful authorisation. Clear legal provisions, as found in a Foreign Services Act, could have clarified appointment procedures and strengthened constitutional checks.
Scandals involving the misuse of diplomatic passports have further damaged the country’s image. Privileges meant for state officials were reportedly extended to politically connected individuals and business people, raising concerns about abuse of state resources. A Foreign Services Act would have established strict eligibility criteria, safeguarding Malawi’s diplomatic identity.
Even resource allocation has suffered in the absence of a guiding framework. In 2023–2024, just like in previous fiscal years, government announced plans to halve the number of diplomats abroad to save K47 billion annually. While fiscal prudence is admirable, the move exposed inefficiencies in staffing—missions overstaffed or occupied by political appointees rather than career professionals. A Foreign Services Act would have rationalised staffing levels, linking them to strategic national priorities rather than political considerations.
My writeup could not be complete if I don’t make mention of the Bridgin Foundation saga of 2022 which remains as one of the most striking examples of how weak institutional safeguards can expose Malawi to reputational risk. The government signed a multi‑billion dollar agreement with a little‑known Belgian entity, only for questions of credibility, transparency, and due diligence to unravel the deal and embarrass the nation. What was initially celebrated as a breakthrough investment quickly became a cautionary tale of how easily Malawi can be misled in international engagements. A Foreign Services Act, would have ensured that such agreements were vetted by qualified diplomats, subjected to parliamentary oversight, and aligned with national priorities.
Older episodes reinforce the urgency of reform. Former Defence Commander Vincent Nundwe, now a diplomat, once declined a proposed diplomatic posting to India under the DPP administration, highlighting how such appointments can be used as political consolation rather than part of a structured career path. The infamous 2013 incident in South Africa, where Malawian diplomats were rounded up at dawn and forcibly repatriated after refusing to return home, exposed the absence of clear rules governing recalls and accountability. An alcohol-related scandal involving Malawian diplomats in South Africa similarly underscored the need for a codified code of conduct, something a Foreign Services Act would explicitly provide.
During the last election cycle, Malawi witnessed troubling cases of diplomats involving themselves in domestic political campaigns, with some even attempting to run for parliamentary seats while serving abroad. Instead of advancing Malawi’s interests, some envoys were drawn into partisan activities. This blurring of professional and political lines undermined both the credibility of the foreign service and trust from international partners. A Foreign Services Act would have clearly defined the roles, responsibilities, and limits of diplomatic officers.
In some cases, diplomats have taken the government to court over disputed recalls, an outcome of unclear tenure terms and inconsistent procedures. Reports of Malawian diplomats abroad seeking asylum after facing recall further highlighted the deep structural weaknesses within our system. Each of these episodes, from Nundwe’s refusal to the South Africa scandals, reveals a bleeding foreign service weakened by improvisation, patronage, and the absence of legal anchoring.
Malawi’s vulnerability in foreign affairs is not a recent phenomenon. During the Kamuzu Banda era, diplomacy was often shaped by regime survival rather than institutional professionalism. From strained relations with neighboring states like Zambia or Tanzania over exiled ministers, to Banda’s controversial ties with apartheid South Africa, and Cold War alignments that prioritized strategic loyalty over human rights, Malawi’s foreign service has long operated without legal anchoring. These historical patterns, where diplomacy served political ends rather than national interests, reinforce the urgency of reform today. A Foreign Services Act would break this cycle, ensuring that Malawi’s global engagement is guided by professionalism, accountability, and long-term national strategy.
The benefits of a Foreign Services Act are undeniable. Alongside the long-discussed school of diplomacy, such legislation would professionalise the diplomatic corps by establishing merit-based recruitment, structured training, career progression, and performance evaluation. It would preserve institutional memory across political transitions, strengthen coordination among ministries and missions, and bring clarity to mandates in trade, security, migration, climate diplomacy, and international cooperation. For international partners and investors, it would enhance predictability and confidence in Malawi’s external engagements.
The urgency cannot be overstated. The world is entering an era of intensified competition for investment, influence, and partnerships. Regional organisations such as SADC and COMESA are evolving, while global challenges like climate change require consistent and skilled representation. Malawi cannot afford a foreign service that is ad hoc or reactive. Our missions abroad must serve as engines of economic diplomacy and development, not ceremonial outposts for party cadres and family.
Anchoring our diplomacy in law would not only prevent scandals and inefficiencies but transform our foreign service into a strategic driver of national development. It would align diplomatic practice with Vision 2063 and other national priorities by mandating missions to actively promote trade, investment, diaspora engagement, and international partnerships.
Kenya’s experience shows that a Foreign Services Act is about more than diplomats, it is about national credibility. Malawi now has an opportunity to follow suit. Ambassador Kena Mphonda’s reflection is not merely a literary contribution; it is a call to action. Just as the Rogers Act of 1924 laid the foundation for the United States’ professional foreign service, Malawi too must take its step forward.
The question is not whether Malawi needs Kena or Chaponda Act of 2025, but whether there is political will to enact it. The scandals of recent years reveal the cost of inaction. The successes of countries like #Kenya show the benefits of reform. Under the leadership of Foreign Affairs Minister George Chaponda and President Mutharika (a former Foreign Affairs Minister himself), this could be a transformative moment for Malawi.
The time to act is now.
send comments to email: kkuntiya@diplomats.com
