LILONGWE-(MaraviPost)-An examination of the United States vice presidency from 2026 moving backward reveals a significant evolution: the role transformed from what John Adams once called “the most insignificant office” into a central hub of modern executive power.
For Malawi, a young democracy that frequently battles structural gridlock and political “paranoia” between the President and the Vice President, the U.S. model offers a blueprint for constitutional reform, clear institutional lines, and administrative boundaries.
In the modern “Partner” Era from 2001 to 2026, the office has become a locus of policy execution and legislative influence.
JD Vance, serving from 2025 to the present, acts as an ideological partner and surrogate in the second Trump administration, with a role heavily emphasizing policy execution and legislative liaison in a highly polarized Congress.
Kamala Harris, from 2021 to 2025, acted as a tie-breaking vote in an evenly split Senate, demonstrating the critical legislative weight the U.S. Constitution assigns to the VP, and was deeply embedded in national security and foreign diplomatic missions.
Joe Biden from 2009 to 2017 and Dick Cheney from 2001 to 2009 solidified the “Gore-Cheney” standard, acting as the President’s chief advisor and “last person in the room” on pivotal economic and defense policies.
The Institutionalization Era from 1976 to 2000 marked a turning point when Walter Mondale revolutionized the office under Jimmy Carter by moving the Vice President’s office into the White House West Wing, gaining full access to intelligence briefings, and establishing the VP as a generalized senior advisor rather than a marginalized outsider.
In the earlier Constitutional Safety-Valve period before 1976, Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller kept the executive branch stable during the Watergate crisis.
Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and the 25th Amendment in 1967 addressed a critical flaw by introducing a clear process to fill vice-presidential vacancies via presidential appointment and congressional confirmation, ending the practice where the office sat vacant until the next election.
Malawi’s political landscape has repeatedly suffered from “The Vice Presidency Trap,” where Presidents view elected running mates as rivals rather than partners.
This has triggered systemic gridlock, such as when former President Lazarus Chakwera stripped the late Saulos Chilima of delegated powers or when current President Peter Mutharika stripped Vice President Jane Ansah of the Department of Disaster Management Affairs following public funding controversies.
Malawi can apply several clear U.S. principles to fix these systemic flaws, beginning with establishing clear constitutional duties.
The U.S. Constitution provides a concrete legislative job by making the Vice President the President of the Senate with tie-breaking votes, whereas the Malawian Constitution leaves the VP’s daily portfolio entirely up to the President’s whims.
When political fallout occurs in Malawi, the President simply strips the VP’s responsibilities, wasting public resources on an empty office, so Malawi should amend the Constitution to assign specific, non-derivative portfolios that cannot be revoked without parliamentary approval.
A second lesson involves fixing the “President-In-Waiting” rivalry by building institutional avenues for dispute resolution.
While U.S. Vice Presidents often harbor future presidential ambitions, they are bound by strict institutional norms to serve the sitting president’s agenda, whereas in Malawi the first vice president is protected from direct dismissal, often turning the office into an opposition camp within government.
Malawi needs to adopt models where the cabinet and legislature hold explicit constitutional powers to arbitrate executive gridlock.
Streamlining vacancy and succession laws offers a third corrective path.
The 25th Amendment allows a U.S. President to smoothly fill a VP vacancy through legislative confirmation while Section 84 of the Malawi Constitution forces the President to rush a new VP appointment within seven days, prioritizing political bargaining over vetting.
Malawi should reform Section 84 to require parliamentary confirmation for mid-term appointments, ensuring that any replacement VP commands broad legislative legitimacy.
Finally, institutionalizing public accountability is essential to curb misuse of office.
The U.S. Vice President’s official travel, staff allocation, and budget are heavily monitored by federal ethics laws and congressional oversight committees, but the Malawian Vice Presidency lacks strict operational and financial guardrails, as shown by public outrage over Jane Ansah’s costly travel expenditures to the UK.
Giving the Office of the Vice President financial and administrative autonomy from the Office of the President and Cabinet must go hand-in-hand with strict parliamentary accountability to protect taxpayer funds.
Conclusion
Malawi’s recurring tensions between presidents and vice presidents reflect not just personal rivalry but structural ambiguity in the Constitution.
By borrowing from the U.S. experience—clear statutory roles, secure succession processes, and robust oversight—Malawi can convert the vice presidency from a source of gridlock into an engine of executive efficiency and democratic stability.
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